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This thesis consists of three independent essays, unified by the common theme of
incentives for effort provision in groups.
In Chapter 2 we develop a multi-stage contest design where heterogeneous agents
face the prospect of promotion and the threat of demotion from one stage to the next.
We illustrate theoretically that if agents are homogeneous in ability, the principal is
better off pooling agents in one division. However, if there are ability differences, the
principal is better off assigning agents to separate divisions based on ability level,
while allowing for agents to be promoted and demoted after each stage of play. The
experimental results support the use of promotion and demotion in multi-stage con-
tests when abilities are heterogeneous. In contrast with the theoretical predictions,
we did not find significant differences in total effort between the pooled contest and
the contest with promotion and demotion when abilities were homogeneous.
Chapter 3 provides a comparison between a two-strike exclusion policy and a zero-
tolerance exclusion policy as a means for fostering cooperation in groups. The
results from our experiment suggest that group members tend to cooperate more
after receiving a strike. However, requiring group members to issue strikes to one
another prior to exclusion seemed to be less effective than allowing for exclusion
without prior receipt of strikes.
In Chapter 4 we determine whether the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering
cooperation is dependent on the degree of approval motivation within teams. Ap-
proval motivation is defined as the desire to produce positive perceptions in others
and the incentive to acquire the approval of others as well as the desire to avoid
disapproval, Martin (1984). The hypotheses developed in the theoretical section
provide support for the notion that individuals will be more responsive to mutual
monitoring if they possess a higher degree of approval motivation. However, the
results generated from the experiment suggest that the efficacy of mutual moni-
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